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At the start of December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. He promised an end to years of warfare in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Not long after, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

This dichotomy highlights the core tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and ending wars—though how this squares with the new air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson reinforced this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This change is significant, but observers note it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented an analyst for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Disinterest and Friction

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable comment on African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has developed with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Targeted Involvement

An analogous tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Rivals

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.